The obliteration of life: depersonalization and disembodiment in the terabyte era by Zwart, H.A.E.






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
The obliteration of life: depersonalization and
disembodiment in the terabyte era
H.A.E. (Hub) Zwart∗
Department of Philosophy and Science Studies (Chair), Faculty of Science, Institute for
Science, Innovation and Society, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The
Netherlands
(Received 5 April 2015; ﬁnal version received 14 January 2016)
Post-genomics allegedly allow us to become the “managers” of our own health.
And yet, human individuality seems to dissolve into massive data streams. What
is the fate of the human subject in the terabyte age? The Human Genome Project
already resulted in personalizing and depersonalizing trends, exempliﬁed by two
types of genomes: the anonymized Human Reference Genome versus the
personal genomes of genomics celebrities. This ambiguity is radicalized by
post-genomics. Life becomes “obliterated”: dissolved into letters and symbols
(e.g. the nucleotide alphabet), but this is complemented by re-personalizing
trends. As a case study, I will analyze the Snyderome, involving a prominent
geneticist who closely monitored “everything” with the help of precision
diagnostics, resulting in a comprehensive (“high coverage”) omics portrait,
highly personal and highly impersonal at the same time, captured in massive
data sets, setting the stage for a digital panopticon: a molecularized
“conscience”, the superego of the terabyte age.
Keywords: personalized genomics; epigenomics; terabyte era; Snyderome;
Psychoanalysis; disembodiment
Introduction
The Human Genome Project (HGP, launched in 1990) resulted in an “initial”
(IHGSC 2001) and a “ﬁnished” composite sequence (IHGSC 2004). The latter is
known as the Human Reference Genome (HRG) and is periodically updated. But
as genome sequencing became “normal science”, the focus of attention shifted to
various post-genomics ﬁelds, notably personalized genomics and epigenomics.
On the one hand, post-genomics allegedly opens up new practices of the Self,
enabling individuals to become health “entrepreneurs” (Harvey 2009). On the
other hand, human individuality seems to dissolve into massive data streams.
What is the fate of the human subject in the terabyte (or even petabyte) age?
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Paradoxically, we witness combinations of personalizing and depersonalizing
trends. The HGP already resulted in two types of genomes: on the one hand the
(anonymized, composite) HRG, on the other hand the personal genomes of geno-
mics celebrities. This ambiguity becomes even more manifest in post-genomics
research. On the one hand, life in general and human life in particular are literally
“obliterated”: dissolved into streams of letters and symbols (from the nucleotide
alphabet up to digital data sets). Living beings are emptied as it were, as the
“ﬂesh of life” is digitalized.
At the same time, there is a trend toward re-personalization and individualiza-
tion. An exempliﬁcation of this is the Snyderome case (Chen et al. 2012), a promi-
nent geneticist who subjected himself to an intense process of close (high
resolution) self-monitoring, measuring “everything”, even those dimensions of
bodily functioning that might seem too trivial, personal or unpleasant, resulting
in an integrative Personal Omics Proﬁle (iPOP) of a single individual, a compre-
hensive omics portrait (“extremely high coverage”), combining “deep sequencing”
(of the genotype) with more than three billion measurements of molecules (i.e. the
phenotype). This portrait is highly personal and highly impersonal at the same time,
as the living individual is both captured and lost in data. Rather than to practices of
the Self, moreover, it gives rise to a digital panopticon: a molecularized version of
the “voice of conscience”; as computers from now on inform us (on a daily basis)
that we must change our life: the superego of the terabyte age.
In this paper, I aim to elucidate this paradox of de- and re-personalization by
taking the idea that life can be represented with the help of alphabets of letters
quite “literally”. Via the textual understanding of life (exempliﬁed by genomics
and post-genomics), the “ﬂesh” of life (i.e. the living being as a recognizable,
living Gestalt) becomes obliterated (disembodied). The design of my paper is as
follows. First, I will present an outline of personalizing and depersonalizing
trends in contemporary life sciences research. Subsequently, I will argue that geno-
mics and post-genomics represent radicalized versions of the tendency toward sym-
bolization and literalization which, according to the psychoanalytic epistemology
of Gaston Bachelard and Jacques Lacan, is inherent in the scientiﬁc endeavor as
such. This claim will be substantiated with the help of a brief anamnesis of the
ongoing “literation” (or even obliteration) of life (from 1900 onwards). In other
words, my diagnostics of the present (the synchronic dimension) is set against
the backdrop of a longer history of self-quantiﬁcation (the diachronic dimension),
culminating in the imperative of massive data production of the “terabyte age” (i.e.
the present), exempliﬁed by the “Snyderome” as my case study.
Depersonalization and re-personalization
In the 1990s, HGP purported to shed light on the question Who are “we”? (Zwart
2007). HGP director Francis Collins claimed that “the human race” was about to
“witness its own blueprint in ﬁne detail” (1999, 28). But also for critical voices,























such as Fukuyama (2002), the idea that the HGP was about to reveal the “factor X”
(i.e. the uniquely human genetic endowment that supposedly would explain our
exceptionality, as not only highly intelligent and
creative, but also chronically discontent and
unhappy beings) became a matter of concern. How
would bioengineers use this new sway over human
existence? The HGP seemed to pave the way for
the leap into post-humanity.
Yet, the “factor X” (the unique human genetic
“essence”) was never found. At face value, there is
nothing remarkable or special about the human
genome (Zwart 2009). Rather, as a quasi-artistic
“portrait”, the typical output of DNA sequencing machines (displayed in the
above ﬁgure) conveys a sense of hyper-modernistic anonymization. In the
context of high throughput sequencing, our “essence” or core identity, instead of
being secured at last, evaporates in massive data sets.
This sense of anonymization is conveyed not only by the outcomes, but also by
the methodology of genomics research, which is conducted by large-scale, multi-
national consortia, involving thousands of researchers and relying on automation
to increase precision, standardization and speed. Genomics publications may list
hundreds of “authors” (in alphabetic order), while the bulk of the work is carried
out by high-tech machinery. Thus, both at the “subject-pole” (the researchers)
and at the “object-pole” (the sequenced individuals) of the knowledge-production
process, human individuality seems to dissolve and disappear from view.
At the same time, paradoxically perhaps, the HGP (and related research endea-
vors) provided a stage for (was given a face by) a select number of highly visible
genomics celebrities, such as James Watson, Francis Collins, Craig Venter, John
Sulston and George Church. Besides their involvement (as science managers) in
the production of highly technical and multi-authored genomics papers (in accord-
ance with the standardized genre formats of scientiﬁc discourse), these celebrities
also published highly personal autobiographical accounts in book form: imagina-
tive personal assessments of the meaning of genomics for society and the future
of human existence (Zwart 2008a), explaining how genomics and post-genomics
will revolutionize the world in general and human healthcare in particular.
Examples of such books (sometimes written with the help of professional
science authors) are The Language of God (Collins 2006) and The Language of
Life (2011) by Francis Collins; Regenesis (2012) by George Church; The
Common Thread (2002) by John Sulston (with Georgina Ferry); A Passion for
DNA (2000) by James Watson and A Life Decoded (2007) and Life at the Speed
of Light (2013) by Craig Venter. Some of the subtitles, such as “DNA and the Revo-
lution in Personalised Medicine” (Collins 2011) or “How Synthetic Biology will
Reinvent Nature and Ourselves” (Church and Regis 2012), are quite telling. Fur-
thermore, many of these celebrities have sequenced and published their own























personal genomes (Church, Venter and Watson), while Sulston collaborated with
artist Marc Quinn to produce a highly personal genomic bio-art portrait (in 2001).
In other words, the human genome endeavor has resulted in two types of
genomes. On the one hand the anonymous HRG, a composite sequence (a Mis-
chperson, in Freudian terms) without identity or “face”, disconnected from any
actual genome sequence belonging to a traceable, identiﬁable human being. By
describing humans in terms of anonymizing strands of letters (the nucleotide
alphabet composed of A, C, G and T), personal identity seems to be (literally)
“obliterated”. On the other hand, by way of “compensation” as it were, HGP celeb-
rities such as Church, Venter and Watson published their individual genome. The
most notable trendsetter is Craig Venter no doubt who, in his autobiography
(2007), explicitly uses genes encountered on his personal sequence as explanatory
factors to come to terms with biographical events. These genomes represent an
emphatically personal, even egocentric dimension of the human genomics endea-
vor, for instance by drawing attention (wittingly or unwittingly) to some particular
genes associated with speciﬁc health problems or personality traits, such as Alzhei-
mer’s in the case of Watson; stress-tolerance, thrill-seeking and colon cancer in the
case of Venter; and narcolepsy in the case of Church. Thus, at the “subject-pole” of
the knowledge-production process, genomics research is both anonymized
(through large-scale research consortia and multiple-author publications) and per-
sonalized (by research managers publishing personal genomes and genomics
memoirs).
Both trends (depersonalization counterpointed by re-personalization), although
apparently moving in opposite directions, actually belong together as the front
side and the reverse side of high-tech biomolecular innovation. They allow us to
see the HGP and its aftermath as an updated enactment of the archetypal Icarus
story. Initially, Icarus represents the position of the (overpromising, assumptive)
genomics celebrity: eager to take risks, willing to use emerging technologies for
unconventional purposes and aiming to reach unprecedented public visibility and
“height”. Eventually, however, the anonymous (invisible, depersonalized) subject
of the genomics era is bereft of its substance, reduced to a mere sequence and
drowned in data (in digital litter).
This same effect becomes noticeable when (personalized) genomics enters the
everyday life-world. On the one hand, human individuals are encouraged to use
high-throughput sequencing data to become the “managers” of their personal
health condition (Harvey 2009), relying on high-resolution health transparency, pro-
vided by next-generation sequencing and epigenomics information. By combining
“static” data (on individualized genome sequences) with “dynamic” data (on the
impact of lifestyle, diet and other characteristics, framed as changeable by individ-
uals), personalized medicine summons us to invest in self-optimization (Prainsack
2015). At the same time, in the era of high-pace sequencing technologies, human
individuality and subjectivity seem to dissolve in depersonalizing data streams. In
other words, genomics and post-genomics, notably the combination of personalized























genomics and epigenomics (as complementary endeavors), seem to invoke both self-
centeredness and a drastic decentralization of the Self.
Literation as the ﬁnal stage of symbolization
The tendency toward depersonalization is not an exclusive feature of genomics, but
constitutes a basic drive in modern science as such. Psychoanalytic epistemologist
Bachelard (1938/1947) already argued that in order for the scientiﬁc knowledge
process to unfold, scientists must break free from the “immediate” (visible, tangi-
ble, ﬂeshy, messy) objects encountered in the prescientiﬁc life-world of everyday
experience. The basic objective of research technologies is to replace this familiar,
mundane, phenomenological world with a new type of experiential space, an arti-
ﬁcial environment: a laboratory setting, where new types of objects (laboratory arti-
facts, unable to exist in the outside world) can be modiﬁed and analyzed under
controlled circumstances, undisturbed by intrusions, complications and noise.
The lab topology incorporates mechanisms of defense, as only small samples of
reality are allowed to enter. The typical laboratory object is a minimal, reduced, dis-
mantled object, no longer viable on its own: a target of choice for the scientiﬁc
cupido sciendi (the researcher’s “will to know”).
But also the scientiﬁc subject position is transformed and decentered (“emptied”
as it were) by automation and laboratory equipment (Bachelard 1938/1947; Serres
1972). At the subject-pole, the epistemological rupture notably entails a cleansing
of the sociocultural heritage of expectations and associations concerning “nature”,
“humanity”, “embodiment”, etc., so that a puriﬁed, optimized, reliable, depersona-
lized and highly functional “subject” remains, dwelling in laboratories, smoothly
interacting with (and increasingly replaceable by) machines. As Bachelard
(1938/1947) argues, this epistemological rupture separates scientiﬁc styles of
knowledge production from “prescientiﬁc” (intuitive, embodied) modes of thinking
and perceiving. Notably, science should cleanse itself from the archetypal images
and ideas that remain inﬂuential in the realm of public imagination. As a self-pro-
claimed psychoanalyst of science, Bachelard devoted bulk of his fascinating oeuvre
to tracing the seductiveness and tenacity of these archetypal “obstacles”, this
psychic “depth”, retarding the exponential growth of scientiﬁc productivity.
This line of thinking was taken up by Jacques Lacan. Science, he argues, entails a
radical modiﬁcation, both of the “object-position” and of the “subject-position” of
science (Lacan 1966). The subject of modern science originally emerged as the
Cartesian cogito, with its emphatic rejection (expulsion) of traditional, prescientiﬁc
knowledge forms as questionable: a subject freed from mundane and religious pre-
conceptions, eventually resulting in a punctual, disembodied subject without sub-
stance or “depth” (728). A similar process unfolds at the object-pole, however. The
history of the contemporary life sciences is a stepwise replacement of ﬂeshy, messy,
tangible entities (living being as a visible “Gestalt”) by carefully documented and
quantiﬁed objects known as model organisms (such as T1 bacteriophages,























Caenorhabditis elegans, Drosophila melanogaster and the nude, immunodeﬁcient
mouse). But even these organisms are systematically “consumed” and “used up” in
the course of a process bent on producing texts (Latour and Woolgar 1979). More-
over, even these laboratory creatures function as mere vehicles (still too messy,
ﬂeshy, etc., in the end) of more drastically disembodied bio-objects, such as
genes. For Delbru¨ck, Luria and other pioneers of bacteriophage research, bacterial
viruses became research objects of choice because they basically counted as “naked
genes” (Watson 1968/1996, 22).1 But now, this process has taken a further decisive
step in the sense that the gene itself (as the ultimate object of molecular genetics)
has begun to evaporate. The term gene (coined in 1909) is becoming a pure signif-
ier, operating as a purely discursive phenomenon, covering up a disconcerting gap,
an entity bereft of its substance, a set of symbols associated with a precarious
concept that is quickly losing its ontological consistency. In the aftermath of the
HGP, the vicissitudes of this core signiﬁer reﬂect the emptying of the object-func-
tion: see, for instance, the current debate concerning the “demise” of the gene
(Moss 2003; Barnes and Dupre´ 2008). Meanwhile, model organisms (as typical
objects of life sciences research) are relentlessly “symbolized”: they are dissolving
into digitalized data sets, storable, retrievable and processable with the help of stan-
dardized collaborative cyber-infrastructures (Leonelli and Ankeny 2012).
From a Lacanian perspective, all this is highly typical, rather than exceptional,
for contemporary science. The cupido sciendi (the “Will to Know”) of the scientiﬁc
endeavor amounts to a process of “symbolization”: that is, the representation (and
eventual obfuscation) of nature with the help of a limited set of algebraic and alpha-
betic symbols. The lived body becomes overridden by textual elements, and the
living being as a Gestalt gives way to a system of signiﬁers, more easily manage-
able than real organisms, so that research can be conducted in silico (with the help
of computers and databases) rather than in vivo (where life remains messy and
recalcitrant). The representation of living entities with the help of alphabetic
symbols (A, C, G and T, for instance) exempliﬁes a process of symbolization
which, rather than being curiosity-driven, is driven by desire, by a “will to
power”. Eventually, it culminates in the “literation” or even “obliteration” of life,
so as to drastically increase biotechnology’s sway over nature, notably on the
level of the “elementary particles of life” (genes, nucleotides, amino acids and
the like). Life no longer seems impenetrable (Miller 2001) as the body as a coherent
whole (Gestalt) gives way to the molecularized body, allowing bioengineers to
operate upon the living with the help of the “algorithms of life”. Thus, human
life and health will become more manageable in the near future, preparing the
way for “algorithmic” governance as the ﬁnal stage of biopower (Rouvroy 2014).
Symbolization and the onset of biological “literacy”
The symbolization of the living, culminating in the HRG, is already quite notice-
able in the work of Gregor Mendel (rediscovered in the spring of 1900), who























speculated about “elements” or “factors” (either dominant or recessive) as ultimate
determinants of phenotypical features with the help of alphabetic symbols (Aa, Bb,
Cc and so on), where uppercase stands for “dominant” and lowercase for “reces-
sive” (Mendel 1866/1913). Mendel already enacted a symbolization or “literation”
of the living, stressing the importance of biological “literacy”. Everything pertain-
ing to the garden pea as a living organism was ﬁltered out. For Mendel, Pisum
sativum was basically a research tool for studying what geneticists came to call
“genes”, conceived as autonomous units, passed on to future generations indepen-
dently of biological categories such as species or sex. In his inaugural lecture, Fou-
cault (1971) presented Mendel (who had published his results in 1866) as a
“monster” (37): a voice that spoke too soon; but in the twentieth century his
approach quickly gained momentum and genetics became the core discipline of
the new biology.
A key aspect of Mendel’s “untimely” epistemic “mutation” consisted in the use
of letters (Aa, Bb, Cc, etc.) to refer to “elements” that could be either present or
absent, and either dominant or recessive. In ancient Greek, the term stoix1ı˜a
(“elements”) referred both to elementary building blocks (of reality or of knowl-
edge) and to the letters of the alphabet, and Mendel used the term “elements” in
a similar way. Indeed, he aimed to see through the living organism (the visible
Gestalt) in order to read the symbols, the stoix1ı˜a, the “letters” within: the geno-
type in the literal sense of “type”.
Rather than being precocious, Mendel’s literation effort was actually the resur-
gence of an idea of long standing: that lo´go6 (i.e. words, language and letters) con-
stitutes the intelligible principle pervading nature. Moreover, lo´go6 can be
encountered on both sides of the knowledge relationship, for a human being
( ) is a reading animal, gifted with language (lo´go6) and therefore
able to discern the lo´go6 of nature: the letters, the stoix1ı˜a of life: that which
renders the apparently chaotic Real intelligible. Nature and life are incarnations
of a primordial text: the language of the Other (in the beginning is the word, ’En
as the Gospel phrases it), and the basic objective of research is to
make this text, this language of the Other, readable. Thus, although it may be
impossible to know what Mendel was consciously thinking (Hartl and Orel
1992), his efforts do reﬂect a recognizable epistemological gesture (Zwart 2008b).
In trying to decipher the letters, moreover, Mendel was not completely at odds
with his Zeitgeist. His contemporary Francis Galton was thinking along similar
lines (Mu¨ller-Wille and Rheinberger 2012, 133). For him, life likewise consisted
of a collection of letters and to read them, biologists had to improve their literacy,
so as to achieve a higher level of resolution.2 Mendel and Galton shared the idea
that the stoix1ı˜a of life were representable by means of letters, so that the idea
of life as a “text” or “code” was born, gaining momentum in the century to
come, when symbolizing life with the help of signiﬁers such as GCA, GCC,
GCG and GCT became the dominant trend. This also explains the abundant use
of terms adopted from linguistics (such as annotation, duplication, translation,























transcription, etc.). Speaking of Zeitgeist, it is certainly no coincidence that the his-
tories of modern genetics and modern linguistics (as key research ﬁelds of the twen-
tieth century) coincide in time (Zwart 2013).
And Mendel was not the only researcher who used letters for “elements”. Also in
the year 1900 (the year of his rediscovery), Karl Landsteiner discovered the blood
types, determined by the (presence or absence) of basic constituents, namely anti-
gens. This likewise resulted in the introduction of a small alphabet of symbols (A,
B, AB and O). During the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century, similar developments
occurred in other branches of research. Quantum physics produced its own alphabet
of elementary particles (e2, P+, H+, Ho, m, etc.) and similar “alphabets” emerged
elsewhere, such as the alphabet of amino acids (Ala, Arg, Asn, Asp, etc.).
This literal understanding of life became a key motif in the new science of life.
The American geneticist of Japanese descent Susumu Ohno (1928–2000) acquired
everlasting fame by coining the (now discredited) term “junk DNA” to emphasize
that our genome apparently contains large chunks of unreadable script. In other
words, a signiﬁcant portion of the “letters” on the human genome was actually
“litter”, that is, letter-like debris, the remainders of evolutionary dramas of the
distant past. Moreover, the most basic principle of life, he argued (in nature as
well as in laboratories), is plagiarism. According to Ohno (1987, 1988), evolution
largely depends upon plagiarizing a relatively small set of innovations which
emerged relatively early in the history of life. What molecular geneticists are
doing in their laboratories basically comes down to plagiarizing molecular inno-
vations developed by microorganisms long ago. The concept of plagiarism
reinforces the “literal” understanding of life, while at the same time conﬁrming
the idea of researchers as subjects “without depth”, processing, copying and anno-
tating the stoix1ı˜a of life in a systematic, automated fashion, driven by the desire
to acquire and propagate a particular kind of literacy.
This concurs, I would argue, with the basic message of the sizable mural (on
wooden panels, almost hundred square meters in size) painted by Pablo Picasso
in 1957–1958 (during the heydays of molecular biology) for the UNESCO head-
quarters in Paris, which came to be known as The
Fall of Icarus.3 There is a stark contrast between
the ﬂeshy, bathing, living, healthy bystanders here
portrayed and Icarus himself: a “minimal” human
being, stripped down to his bare essentials, so that
only the (genomic) skeleton remains, about to
drown (in a sea of data). Indifferent (eye-less)
bystanders silently witness how Icarus is about to
disappear from view, while his body seems trans-
formed into an X-ray picture.
Picasso himself persistently refused to comment on the “meaning” of his
artwork, but others connected it with the nuclear bombs that put an end to World
War II (as UNESCO was established in response to the prospect of global























nuclear devastation).4 Genome research began with the work of pioneers such as
Hermann Joseph Muller (1890–1967) who studied mutations caused by X-ray
radiation in drosophila, and interest in human genomics was likewise fueled by
the genetic damage inﬂicted by nuclear radiation, which explains why the US
Department of Energy (DOE) played such a decisive role (as a funding agency)
in the human genome endeavor (Kay 2000). From this perspective, the Fall of
Icarus becomes the portrayal of a human being (a research subject) whose
“ﬂesh” is obliterated so that the (fragile) genotype is exposed. And it is no coinci-
dence that Picasso painted his mural when, in the aftermath of the discovery of the
structure of DNA in 1953, the human “essence” was being disclosed with the help
of (ﬂeshless, disembodied) alphabetic symbols. Picasso’s X-ray ﬁgure exposes
humanity’s genetic “essence” (DNA). Nuclear bombs and the discovery of DNA,
as landmark “achievements” of twentieth-century science, brought about by
elementary particle physics and molecular genetics, respectively, converged in dis-
closing the letters (stoix1ı˜a) of matter, energy and life, thereby obliterating the
living, which explains why physicists (Debru¨ck, Schro¨dinger, Wilkins, Crick,
etc.) played such a decisive role in the postwar molecular biology revolution.
The process of symbolization or “literation” implies that living beings as visible,
tangible entities are substituted by laboratory artifacts and subsequently stripped
down to their bare essentials, captured by sequences of signiﬁers, and eventually
by the barcodes of life, storable and modiﬁable by means of information and com-
munications technology (Thacker 2005). This process of ob-literation has de-car-
nated life, making it computational and ﬂeshless, building on a technological
way of thinking (represented by Daedalus the t1xnxth6, the archetypal engineer).
Yet, much like the ﬁsher, the shepherd and the peasant depicted on Landscape with
the Fall of Icarus by Brueghel in the 1560s, the bystanders (i.e. the speaking
masses), immersed in the realities of their daily lives, so far remain indifferent to
Icarus’s fall. For the time being, the impact of the latter’s “fall” (the reduction of
human beings and living entities to sequences and barcodes) is hardly noticeable.
Notwithstanding the spectacular rhetoric of (post-)genomics, individuals are not
reinventing themselves en masse with the help of their personal sequence.
The imperative of data production
For Lacan, symbolization is the basic impetus of modern science, as we have seen.
In his Seminars, the ﬁrst of which actually coincided with the discovery of the
structure of DNA in 1953 (Lacan 1953–1954/1975), the symbolization of life
by molecular genetics is discussed on various occasions. Life, Lacan argues, is
described in terms of nucleotide and genes, that is, in terms of combinations of sig-
niﬁers, referring to basic elements that can be either present or absent. Molecular
biology uncovers life as a “typographical” realm (1957–1958/1998, 147). And
Lacan underscores how the notion of “information” has permeated contemporary
scientiﬁc discourse “with the speed of lightning” (1972–1973/1975, 21/22). Life























is conceived in terms of a series of lines and dots, of 0s and 1s, in which all sorts of
typos may occur. This notably applies, he argues, to the molecular “information” of
genes as strands of DNA, wrapped around each other, from where messages are
recorded and distributed: a linguistic phenomenon, basically. Thus, the reproduc-
tion of life is ultimately determined by something which in itself is neither living
nor non-living: a molecular program, known as the “codon”, situated on the
chromosomes (Lacan 1971–1972/2011, 43) and characterized by repetitiveness:
the tendency of life to continuously reproduce itself.
A similar tendency can be discerned at the subject-pole of the knowledge
relationship. Molecular researchers themselves are reduced to functional, replace-
able subjects, driven by a basic imperative, voiced by the Other (i.e. funding
agencies, university boards and other authoritative agencies): continue to
produce more knowledge! (Lacan 1969–1970/1991, 120). The researchers
involved are not literally told to do so. Rather, this imperative functions as an
unconscious injunction, fueling contemporary science as such (121). Now that
we have unraveled the secrets of molecular structures, it seems impossible to put
brakes on the torrent of signiﬁers and symbolic combinations produced by molecu-
lar research. Once this process has been unleashed, it no longer seems an option not
to obey its basic Commandment: go on, produce more data (121), also because this
process is expected to provide us with an “inconceivable” power over life.
Both the number of genomics papers and the number of genomes (of humans and
other species) that are sequenced are growing exponentially, resulting in massive
amounts of letters, the bulk of which must be regarded as symbolic “litter”. And
now that we have entered the tera- or even petabyte era of “precision medicine”,5
the amounts of data produced are reaching staggering levels. Genomics celebrity
Craig Venter, for instance, recently launched a new initiative named Human Long-
evity Inc. (HLI)6 committed to build the world’s largest genotype/phenotype data-
base by sequencing 40,000 genomes per year. The goal is to have 1,000,000 human
genomes sequenced by 2020. His initiative rivals the ofﬁcial, publicly funded pre-
cision medicine program recently announced by Barack Obama, with Francis
Collins (once again, but now as director of NIH) acting as the President’s ghost
writer. Precision medicine aims to integrate Big Data coming from various clinical,
molecular, multi-omics, environmental and behavioral sources, allowing scientists
to deepen their understanding of the biological basis of health and disease. The goal
is to develop prevention and treatment strategies that take individual variability into
account with the help of large-scale biological databases and computational tools
for analyzing enormous data sets (Collins and Varmus 2015). In other words, we
have entered the post-genomics terabyte world.
The terabyte era: from the HRG to the kenotic Self
The newness of these new initiatives resides in a shift of focus from the (anonymous)
HRG of “traditional” genomics toward the personal genomes of next-generation























sequencing, unique for every human being: a multiplication of the standard (imper-
sonal) sequence (“our” genome) into multiple (personalized) genomes (“my”
genome; cf. Venter 2010). But as genome sequences are much too similar to
explain diversity, personalized genomics is complemented by other post-genomics
endeavors, notably epigenomics: the study of changes to gene expression caused
by chemical modiﬁcation of DNA (via processes such as DNA methylation and
histone modiﬁcation). Genomes are marked with chemical tags responsible for
specialization, while organismal plasticity can be explained as molecular responsivity
to the environment (the “environome”). Genes are turned on or off to affect inter-
actions between DNA and the cellular protein-making machinery. These contextually
induced alterations of gene expression are semi-stable and may be transmitted across
generations. For this reason, epigenomics aspires a broadening of the epistemic
horizon, bringing the social and material environment (notably, early-life adversities)
into molecular research (Niewo¨hner 2011, 2015). Through epigenetics, the genome
acquires a “life span” (Lappe´ and Landecker 2015).
But again, this “broadening” of the horizon paradoxically coincides with a “nar-
rowing” of that same horizon as well. Although the focus on genes seems to be
opened up to take history and environment into account (so that epigenetic research
practices purport to be more “mundane”), the social and natural environment is at
the same time thoroughly molecularized. Only a thoroughly symbolized (molecu-
larized) “world” can be taken into account. The environment is reduced to the
“environome” or “exposome”, the environmental equivalent of genome (Miller
and Jones 2014): that part of external reality which can be sequenced by next-gen-
eration sequencing machines. In other words, the environment is made readable as
a series of molecular messages. In a similar way, history (adverse life events and
stress-evoking challenges) is reduced to traceable molecular evidence (to informa-
tional sediment) accumulating within cells.
Taken together, this combination of personalized genomics and epigenomics con-
stitutes the core of life sciences research in the terabyte age, giving rise to an
“explosion of new data” (Nature 2010). Big projects within the epigenomics “archi-
pelago” (Meloni 2015a) such as ROADMAP, launched by IHEC (the International
Human Epigenome Consortium), are presented as the life sciences equivalent of
the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) of the European Organization for Nuclear
Research, producing one gigabyte of data a second. But precisely for that reason, epi-
genomics provides “an excellent theoretical spyglass through which to see the chan-
ging thought-style (and possibly ethos) of the biosciences in this early twenty-ﬁrst
century” (Meloni 2015b, 125).Notably, epigenomics aims tomovebeyond themech-
anisms of defense, the epistemic ﬁlters ofmainstream genomics.More than a century
after the inauguration ofMendelian genetics, epigenomics gives the ﬂoor to “heretic”
and “disgraced” lines of thinking in biology, forwhichMeloni uses a “psychoanalytic
metaphor . . . the return of the repressed” (2015a, 118), revolving around the idea
that “historical and psychological traumas” do leave their marks, their litter as it
were, on the genome (120). The genome is sensitive to environmental noise.























Epigenomics is expected not only to elucidate normal cell functioning, but also
to highlight epigenetic changes that contribute to various recalcitrant diseases such
as cancer. Often, such changes respond to environmental factors (“nurture”) to
which bodies are exposed, so that human health is captured by the equation:
Health ¼ Genome + Exposome. The goal of large-scale epigenomics projects
such as ROADMAP, ENCODE and BLUEPRINT
is to produce hundreds of reference epigenomes,
freely available in the public domain for research-
ers worldwide. Thus, in a recent publication (95
authors) by the Roadmap Epigenomics Consor-
tium (2015), a leap is made from 1 HRG in
2004 to 111 human reference epigenomes now.
Rapid release of raw sequence data is of key
importance in this process.
BLUEPRINT is the European version of this
trend, funded by the EU. The acronym seems
symptomatic. Whereas the notion of the genome
as a blueprint (abundantly used during the
1990s, the heydays of the HGP) had fallen into
disrepute (as life proved much too complex to be explained on the basis of the
genome alone), the objective of this new endeavor is to sequence this “other”
(Stelmach and Nerlich 2015), higher resolution version of a blueprint, instructing
molecules how to create speciﬁc cells. The new powerful combination of next-
generation sequencing and epigenomics is expected to succeed where traditional
genomics projects fell short (Waggoner and Uller 2015), providing a comprehen-
sive, high-density portrayal of the molecular algorithms of life (Miller 2001).
These initiatives result in insatiable data hunger. In order to achieve epigenomics
goals, horrendous amounts of data (procured from human individuals) are needed.
And we are all expected to become data donors. The Human Genome Organisation
(HUGO) regards “the willingness to share information” as a praiseworthy contri-
bution to society (2007), representing a transformation in health perspective
from Me to We (Dickenson 2013). According to the EUROBAROMETER, a sig-
niﬁcant majority of the European public sees the sharing and disclosure of personal
information as a necessary part of modern life. Big data are not something to accept
or reject: we are all in it together already. Wittingly or unwittingly, we are impli-
cated in the current terabyte data deluge. Collectively, we create 2.5 quintillion
bytes of data daily, so that 90% of the data in the world today have been created
in the last two years or so. And it is against this backdrop of “Big Dataism” that
personalized genomics and epigenomics evolve.
But once again, the paradox unfolds. On the one hand, epigenomics purports to
bring the biomedical body closer to the “lived body”, dwelling in a sociocultural
life-world. The biomedical concept of the body is allegedly familiarized and per-
sonalized, as if molecular biology is ﬁnally able to acknowledge a basic























phenomenological insight, namely that, rather than being locked up in a disembo-
died subject-position (as Cartesian ego’s), we are open to the world, as mundane,
intentional beings (as beings in the world), so that the separation of the human
world into a “biological” and a “social” domain is ﬁnally undone (Meloni
2015b). At the same time, however, this “world” is drastically molecularized. As
Niewo¨hner (2011) phrases it, epigenomics amounts to a “molecularization of bio-
graphy and milieu”. The sociocultural world is only taken into account to the extent
that it can be subjected to a process of literation, allowing us to make its molecular
lo´go6 readable via automated reading machines.
Thus, on the one hand, a new concept of the body seems to emerge in biomole-
cular discourse, namely the embedded, biosocial body, open to our sociocultural
surroundings, even on the molecular level (Moss 2002), a world-openness which
represents a signiﬁcant rupture with mainstream twentieth-century biology,
especially genetics (Meloni 2015b, 139). Genomes are studied “in context”,
thereby allegedly bridging the nature–nurture gap (Lock 2013) and overcoming
the “gene-centric” model of life (Barnes and Dupre´ 2008; Pickersgill et al.
2013). Both societal inﬂuences and bodily plasticity are taken into account, focus-
ing on the molecular marks of sociocultural imprinting and exposure: the molecular
language via which the environment “talks to us” (Carey 2012). And yet, biography
and milieu are only acknowledged insofar as they can be made readable by the tech-
nologies of molecular literacy. Scientists frame their questions in molecular terms,
and the world becomes noticeable only in this high-tech format of biomolecular
stimuli and responses. In other words, the re-familiarized body dwells in a molecu-
lar ambiance, obfuscating the inexorable, unreadable, recalcitrant Real (only
noticeable as intrusions or stains, as complications or derailments, in the folds
and margins of the ongoing obliteralization process).
Thus, the re-familiarized body at the same time entails a dissolution of indivi-
duality in large-scale databases and electronic networks. In the post-genomics
era, vast databases of biological information are developed, producing standards
of normalcy as points of orientation for personalized Selves. These repositories
of genomics, epigenomics and other -omics data (such as methylation data) are
massively produced, exemplifying a tendency toward anonymization. Individuality
becomes dissolved in large-scale data networks. Like Icarus, human individuality is
drowned in a sea of data. We have become aggregates of data: data without bodies.
Life is obliterated by “radical” technologies for producing and circulating vast
amounts of information at an astonishing pace.
The term Big Data does not refer to a tangible entity or object, but rather to a
“hyper-object” (Morton 2013), something which no longer seems in need of
mediation or objectiﬁcation, bypassing language even, generating seamless bits
of code (Rouvroy 2014). In other words, human life is becoming kenotic.7 We
are emptying ourselves, dissolving into clouds of bits and bytes, and ﬁlled up
again with data, as the new discourse of the Other, with its (rigidly anonymized)
normativity, framed in terms of normalcy levels, that is, biomedical standard























expectations, adapted to an individual’s age, sex, ethnicity, etc. (Prainsack 2015).
Previous instances of “personalizm” and “personization” (Chadwick 2011), pre-
vious ideas and concepts pertaining to personhood and identity, are obfuscated
or even erased to make room for these new sets of data-based, quantiﬁed indicators
and operationalizations of me-ness. The “Snyderome case” may serve as a case
study, a perfect exempliﬁcation of this turn: a meticulously documented conden-
sation, in which all the key trends discussed so far converge under a single heading.
iPOP: the Snyderome case
In 2012, Michael Snyder and his team (the Department of Genetics at Stanford Uni-
versity) published the “iPOP” of a single individual, a 54-year-old male volunteer,
whom they had closely monitored over the course of 14 months (Chen et al. 2012).8
This longitudinal case study resulted in a comprehensive omics portrait (“extremely
high coverage”), combining “deep sequencing” (of the genotype) with more than
three billion measurements of molecules (i.e. the phenotype). Although the
research subject was a “healthy individual”, the project at the same time amounted
to a case study in the sense of a Krankengeschichte as two minor viral infections,
together with (unexpected) evidence of the subject’s propensity for diabetes, con-
stituted the clinical highlights of the story.
Soon, it turned out that the “male volunteer” of this N ¼ 1 experiment (sur-
rounded by qualiﬁed personnel and costly equipment) was none other than
Michael Snyder himself, the department chair now acting as his own research
subject of choice, turning his body into an omics laboratory. The experiment
resulted in what has been referred to as the Snyderome9 or even the Narciss-ome
(Dennis 2012).10 Snyder himself made it known that he plans to remain a study
subject for life,11 adding new sources of information as the process unfolds, includ-
ing data procured from body samples such as breath, urine, feces (“stool micro-
biome”), saliva, etc.; in other words, bodily materials released via bodily
apertures known in psychoanalysis as “erogenous zones”.
When Michael Snyder presented an update of his in-depth N ¼ 1 experiment
during the annual HUGO meeting in Kuala Lumpur (15 March 2015), his lively
report reminded me of the famous psychoanalytical rule of free association (the
“X-ray tomography of the human mind”, Gru¨nbaum 2002), summoning patients
to say anything that comes to mind, however trivial or unpleasant. As Freud
himself phrased it:
We instruct the patient to . . . report to us whatever internal observations he is
able to make [taking care not to] exclude any of them, whether on the ground
that it is too disagreeable or too indiscreet to say, or that it is too unimportant or
irrelevant. (1917/1940, 297)
In the era of personalized medicine, this seems once again the rule: record,
report, accumulate and analyze anything: data of any kind must be included.
Especially waste products (bodily “litter”) may contain highly valuable information























about what is going on under the surface. Ostensibly healthy individuals become
(potential) patients. Thus, the Snyderome project exempliﬁes the principle of “lit-
eration”: life in general, but notably life’s refuse (life’s “litter”), is transformed into
letters (litera or littera in Latin). And as sequencing machinery produces streams of
data, vast amounts of symbolic sediments are deposited along the way, junk data as
it were: the “littoral” dimension of the literation process.12
Freud himself employed a similar strategy in his Traumdeutung, one might
argue, likewise the result of an N ¼ 1 self-monitoring project, as he basically
reported and analyzed his own dream material (disregarded as a waste product of
mental life by normal science at that time): a self-analysis turning “litter” into
texts. An individual’s omics data provide a window into the biological “uncon-
scious” as it were (Zwart 2013): producing steady streams of signiﬁers, associated
with ongoing metabolic processes, erupting every now and then as (physically
noticeable) symptoms (“spike events”). Thus, personalized genomics has led to a
rehabilitation of the individual case study, which also constituted the empirical
basis of psychoanalysis.
The Cell article on the Snyderome cited above ends with the hope that more case
studies will follow, so that large databases can be compiled with complete time-
dynamic proﬁles for growing numbers of individuals (Chen et al. 2012, 1305).
According to Snyder and his colleagues, the idea that a medical examination can
be based on a mere handful of conventional measurements must be discarded as
“primitive”. Why measure ﬁve or ten items when you can measure 40,000? In
other words, the Snyderome project exempliﬁes a culmination point, building on
several previous paradigm shifts in medicine: from the intuitive “clinical gaze” of
the general practitioner (Foucault 1963), via evidence-based medicine of recent
decades, up to the era of personalized, high-resolution precision medicine known
as “Me medicine” (Dickenson 2013). What used to be diffuse and opaque is now
quickly becoming articulate and discrete. Thus, Snyder presents himself as a repre-
sentative of an avant-garde, and his case study as a window into our personalized,
kenotic future. All other “sources of the Self” (Taylor 1989), all the cultural depths
and horizons of selfhood, are emptied out or obfuscated, and subsequently reﬁlled,
by these data-rich technologies, paving the way for a data-driven Self.
And indeed, the Snyderome project not only serves as a personalized medicine
experiment, but also as a test-bed for the latest omics technologies. For besides
being the chair of one of the world’s most prominent genetics departments,
Michael Snyder is also involved in high-tech omics companies, as founder and
consultant for Personalis, member of the scientiﬁc advisory board of GenapSys
and consultant for Illumina, for instance.13 In other words, kenotic me-ness is
not ﬁrst and foremost a conceptual or rhetorical shift (a new vocabulary or ideol-
ogy so to speak), but primarily something which pertains to the technological
base of post-genomics knowledge production, so that the kenotic Self must be
regarded as a power-effect of the new type of scientiﬁc information thus
produced.























The Snyder case is not without precedents of course. As a more journalistic
forerunner, the Experimental Man project should be mentioned,14 a multiple
omics endeavor initiated by science author Duncan (2009), in collaboration
with the University of California, Berkeley, and various companies. Besides
Duncan’s personal genome sequence, its products include an algorithm for a per-
sonalized prediction of the risk of having a heart attack, based on multiple
measurements (lipids, triglycerides, cholesterol, heart computerized tomography
scan, ultrasound imaging of carotid arteries, etc.).
Genealogically speaking, the project builds on a longer tradition of self-quanti-
ﬁcation, as a subgenre of the practices of the Self, much older even than the Freu-
dian couch. As a ﬁrst historical precedent, the auto-experiment performed by
Sanctorius in the seventeenth century can be mentioned (Zwart 2000; Smith
2007). Sanctorius, professor at Padua from 1611 to 1624, was obsessed with weigh-
ing personal body ﬂuctuations. For 30 years, and
with the help of a special, self-constructed chair
on which he lived, Sanctorius not only meticu-
lously weighed himself, but also everything he
ate and drank, as well as his urine and feces, com-
paring the weight of food intake to that of waste
products. By doing so, he systematically quantiﬁed
himself. Snyder’s experiment can be seen as a radi-
calized, terabyte version of Sanctorius’ longitudi-
nal N ¼ 1 self-monitoring endeavor, resulting in
a terabyte “Me”, a radically externalized Self, pro-
duced with the help of high-precision self-
diagnostics.
Snyder’s idea is that, via high-resolution self-
monitoring, human individuals will become the
proactive managers of their own health condition (rather than hypochondriacs).
Longitudinal multi-omics analysis will allow “us” to take medicine into our own
hands, with doctors acting as mere advisors (with whom we will communicate
via websites and portals) rather than as “dictators”. Individuals will not only
monitor huge amounts of body molecules in a detailed manner, but will also
heavily wire themselves, so as to register pulse, heartbeat, stress (transpiration)
and numerous other indicators continuously. Thus, the focus of attention is dis-
placed from the weight scale to a plethora of high-tech gadgets. Measurements
of thousands of factors can be integrated through devices such as iPhones and com-
pared with big data references, available 24/7 at open-source repositories (vast
science clouds), so that self-diagnostics can be translated into everyday options
(diet, exercise, etc.). It is expected that especially the etiology of mystery symptoms
(such as unexplained fatigue) can thus be elucidated.
But once again, the paradox emerges. Rather than opening up practices of the
Self, allowing individuals to refashion their own lives, the Big Data repositories























which provide reference data (i.e. standards for normality) can easily become a
ubiquitous electronic panopticon: a molecularized version of the super-ego,
the “voice of conscience” of the terabyte age. On a daily basis, computer “moni-
tors” will be telling individuals that they better change their lives (Sloterdijk
2009) in order to optimize somatic functioning, and to live up to health and nor-
malcy standards, and/or to postpone the impacts of unhealthy lifestyles and
ageing.
Concluding remarks: from Big Data to kenotic life
Processes of biomedical symbolization and literation seem to be heading for an
Omega point, as omics data claim to make human life fully transparent with the
help of data-rich characterizations of individuals, at various stages of health and
disease (Prainsack 2015), providing a comprehensive, high-density portrayal of a
person’s health status, combining static (e.g. gene sequence) with dynamic (life-
style, responses to environmental challenges, etc.) data, resulting in the “end of
medical history” as it were. In the near future, patients may even pay for their
healthcare (freely offered to them) with their data: the new currency of the upcom-
ing petabyte age.
This concurs with an analysis by Cetina (2005) who notices a shift of focus in
contemporary culture toward “life as such”. Enlightenment ideals are “emptied
out” (76), she argues, dissolved into networks and automated electronic infor-
mation structures (77), while individuals are called upon to engineer their own
fate, so that the focus of attention now is on molecular and visceral dimensions,
rather than on things such as Bildung or even IQ (78). Biology is not destiny,
but changeable, open to optimization: a constructive project, fueled by techno-
scientiﬁc promises.
And yet, paradoxically, this cleansing of life produces its own messiness, its own
sediment of pointless (“junk”) data. New omics tools give rise to a data deluge of
often meaningless and incidental bits of data, eavesdropping on the bagatelle of
everyday existence, shed by humans on a daily basis and stored and analyzed in
digital media. Thus, on the one hand, human life becomes kenotic. We are
emptied, externalized, uploaded and then ﬁlled up again with data. What was
once propagated by deconstructionist philosophy is now happening in real life:
the human subject dissolves into the symbolic order of electronic networks. But
the exponential growth curve of data production inevitably becomes a key
symptom (in the Lacanian sense of “sinthome”, Lacan 1975–1976/2005) of con-
temporary life sciences research itself. For indeed, we become drowned in data,
and an obsessive jouissance seems involved in this erupting data spate, fueled by
a frantic drive to capture the real through symbolization, amounting not only to
an emptying or ob-litteration of life (dissolving individuality into pure data), but
also to new forms of messiness, to massive amounts of digital litter, as the recur-
rence of the inexorable Real.
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Notes
1. James Watson’s biography exempliﬁes this rupture. Drawn into biology by his favorite
adolescent pastime of birdwatching, at the university his focus shifted from birds to genes, as
explained in the ﬁrst chapters of The Double Helix (Watson 1968/1996).
2.
Ova and their contents are, to biologists looking at them through microscopes, much what
mail-bags and the heaps of letters poured out of them are to those who gaze through the
glass windows of a post ofﬁce . . . they cannot read a single word of what the letters
contain. (Galton 1875, 82)
3. Picasso himself referred to it as “Humanity turning its gaze towards the happy future” (Cabanne
1977, 487). Georges Salles, honorary director of French Museums, dubbed the artwork The Fall
of Icarus in his inaugural speech (Di Lauro 2004).
4. Another link with contemporary science is that Picasso, while working on the mural, noticed the
Russian Sputnik orbiting overhead (at Nice Airport), an experience which ﬁlled him with
excitement. Thus, the mural connects nuclear physics, space travel and the genome, the three




7. The term kxnvsi6 refers to a process of Self-emptying or Self-renunciation. Cf. Paul’s Letter to
the Philippians (2:7) where it is said that Jesus “emptied himself” (of His previous, divine
attributes so as to assume a new, servile human shape).






12. For Lacan’s “Joycean” employment of the various connections between letter, litter, literal,




H.A.E. (Hub) Zwart http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8846-5213
References
Bachelard, G. 1938/1947. La formation de l’esprit scientiﬁque: Contribution a` une psychanalyse de la
connaissance objective. Paris: Vrin.
Barnes, B., and J. Dupre´. 2008. Genomes and what to Make of them. Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press.
Cabanne, P. 1977. Picasso: His Life and Times. New York: William Morrow.
Carey, N. 2012. The Epigenetics Revolution: How Modern Biology is Rewriting Our Understanding
of Genetics, Disease and Inheritance. London: Icon.























Chadwick, R. 2011. “Personal genomes: No Bad news?” Bioethics 25 (2): 62–65.
Chen, R., George I. Mias, Jennifer Li-Pook-Than, Lihua Jiang, Hugo Y.K. Lam, Rong Chen, Elana
Miriami, et al. 2012. “Personal Omics Proﬁling Reveals Dynamic Molecular and Medical Phe-
notypes.” Cell 148: 1293–1307. doi:10.1016/j.cell.2012.02.009.
Church, G., and E. Regis. 2012. Regenesis: How Synthetic Biology will Reinvent Nature and Our-
selves. New York: Basic Books.
Collins, F. 1999. “Medical and Societal Consequences of the Human Genome Project.” New England
Journal of Medicine 341: 28–37.
Collins, F. 2006. The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. New York: Free
Press (Simon & Schuster).
Collins, F. 2011. The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalised Medicine.
New York: Harper.
Collins, F., and H. Varmus. 2015. “A New Initiative on Precision Medicine.” New England Journal of
Medicine 372: 793–795. doi:10.1056/NEJMp1500523.
Dennis, C. 2012. “The Rise of the ‘Narciss-Ome’. Proﬁles of a Researcher’s Genes, Proteins andMore
Show Personalized Genomic Medicine in Action.” http://www.nature.com/news/the-rise-of-the-
narciss-ome-1.10240
Dickenson, D. 2013. Me Medicine vs. We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the Common
Good. New York: Columbia University Press.
Di Lauro, F. 2004. “Falling into the Dark Side: Ominous Motifs in the Fall of Icarus Myth”. 2002
Conference of the Religion, Literature and the Arts Society. Sydney: RLA Press.
Duncan, D. E. 2009. Experimental Man: What One Man’s Body Reveals about his Future, Your
Health and Our Toxic World. Hoboken: Wiley.
Foucault, M. 1963. Naissance de la clinique: Une arche´ologie du regard me´dical. Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France.
Foucault, M. 1971. L’ordre du discours. Paris: Gallimard.
Freud, S. 1917/1940. Vorlesungen zur Einfu´hrung in die Psychoanalyse [Gesammelte Werkte XI].
London: Imago.
Fukuyama, F. 2002. Our posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gru¨nbaum, A. 2002. “Critique of Psychoanalysis.” In The Freud Encyclopedia: Theory, Therapy, and
Culture, edited by E. Erwin, 117–136. New York: Routledge.
Hartl, D. L., and V. Orel. 1992. “What did Gregor Mendel Think he Discovered?” Genetics 131:
245–253.
Harvey, A. 2009. “From Genetic Risk to Post-Genomic Uncertainties: Nutrigenomics and the Birth of
the ‘Genetic Entrepreneur’.” New Genetics and Society 28 (2): 119–137.
HUGO. 2007. “HUGO Statement on Pharmacogenomics (PGx): Solidarity, Equity and Governance.”
Genomics, Society and Policy 3 (1): 44–47.
IHGSC. 2001. “Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome.” Nature 405: 860–921.
IHGSC. 2004. “Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the Human Genome.” Nature 431: 931–945.
Kay, L. 2000. Who Wrote the Book of Life? A History of the Genetic Code. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Knorr Cetina, K. 2005. “The Rise of a Culture of Life: The Biological Sciences are Encouraging the
Move Away from the Ideals of the Enlightenment towards an Idea of Individual Perfectibility and
Enhancement.” EMBO Reports 6: S76–S80.
Lacan, J. 1953–1954/1975. Le se´minaire I: Les E´crits Techniques de Freud. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lacan, J. 1957–1958/1998. Le se´minaire V: Les Formations de l’inconscient. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lacan, J. 1966. “La science et la ve´rite´.” In E´crits, edited by J. Lacan, 855–877. Paris: E´ditions du
Seuil.
Lacan, J. 1969–1970/1991. Le se´minaire XVII : L’envers de la psychanalyse. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.























Lacan, J. 1971/2006. Le se´minaire XVIII: D’un discours qui ne serait pas du semblant. Paris: E´ditions
du Seuil.
Lacan, J. 1971–1972/2011. Le se´minaire XIX: . . . Ou pire. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lacan, J. 1972–1973/1975. Le se´minaire XX: Encore. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lacan, L. 1975–1976/2005. Le se´minaire XXIII: Le sinthome. Paris: E´ditions du Seuil.
Lappe´, M., and H. Landecker. 2015. “How the Genome Got a Life Span.” New Genetics and Society
34 (2): 152–176. doi:10.1080/14636778.2015.1034851.
Latour, B., and S. Woolgar. 1979. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientiﬁc Facts. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Leonelli, S., and R. Ankeny. 2012. “Re-thinking Organisms: The Impact of Databases on Model
Organism Biology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43: 29–36.
Lock, M. 2013. “The Epigenome and Nature/Nurture Reuniﬁcation: A Challenge for Anthropology.”
Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in Health and Illness 32 (4): 291–308. doi:10.
1080/01459740.2012.746973.
Meloni, M. 2015a. Heredity 2.0: The Epigenetics Effect. New Genetics and Society 34 (2): 117–124.
Meloni, M. 2015b. “Epigenetics for the Social Sciences: Justice, Embodiment, and Inheritance in the
Postgenomic Age.” New Genetics and Society 34 (2): 125–151. doi:10.1080/14636778.2015.
1034850.
Mendel, G. 1866/1913. “Versuche u¨ber Pﬂanzenhybriden”. In Versuche u¨ber Pﬂanzenhybriden: zwei
Abhandlungen. Ostwald’s Klassiker der exakten Wissenschaften 121, pp. 3–46. Leipzig:
Engelmann.
Miller, J.-A. 2001. “Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body.” Lacanian Ink 18: 6–29.
Miller, G. W., and D. P. Jones. 2014. “The Nature of Nurture: Reﬁning the Deﬁnition of the Expo-
some.” Toxicological Sciences 137 (1): 1–2. doi:10.1093/toxsci/kft251.
Morton, T. 2013. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and ecology after the end of the world. Minneapolis: Uni-
versity of Minnesota Press.
Moss, L. 2002. “From Representational Preformationism to the Epigenesis of Openness to the
World?” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 981 (1): 219–229.
Moss, L. 2003. What Genes Can’t Do. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mu¨ller-Wille, S., and H.-J. Rheinberger. 2012. A Cultural History of Heredity. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Nature. 2010. “Time for the Epigenome.” Nature 463: 587.
Niewo¨hner, J. 2011. “Epigenetics: Embedded Bodies and the Molecularisation of Biography and
Milieu.” BioSocieties 6: 279–298.
Niewo¨hner, J. 2015. “Epigenetics: Localizing Biology through Co-laboration.” New Genetics and
Society 34 (2): 219–242. doi:10.1080/14636778.2015.1036154.
Ohno, S. 1987. “Repetition as the Essence of Life on this Earth: Music and Genes.” Haemotology and
Blood Transfusion 31: 511–518.
Ohno, S. 1988. “On Periodicities Governing the Construction of Genes and Proteins.” Animal Gen-
etics 19: 305–316.
Pickersgill, M., Niewo¨hner, J., Mu¨ller, R., Martin, P., and Cunningham-Burley, S. 2013. “Mapping the
New Molecular Landscape: Social Dimensions of Epigenetics.” New Genetics and Society 32
(4): 429–447. doi:10.1080/14636778.2013.861739.
Prainsack, B. 2015. “Is Personalized Medicine Different? (Reinscription: the sequel). Response to
Troy Duster.” The British Journal of Sociology 66 (1): 28–35.
Roadmap Epigenomics Consortium (95 authors). 2015. “Integrative Analysis of 111 Reference
Human Epigenomes.” Nature 518: 317–330. doi:10.1038/nature14248.
Rouvroy, A. 2014. “Data Without (Any)Body? Algorithmic Governmentality as Hyper-disadjoint-
ment and the Role of Law as Technical Organ (Conference Abstract).” Conference on general























organology: The co-individuation of minds, bodies, social organisations and techne`, University
of Kent, November 20–22. http://nootechnics.org/
Serres, M. 1972. Hermes II: L’interfe´rence. Paris: Les E´ditions de Minuit.
Sloterdijk, P. 2009. Du musst dein Leben a¨ndern: U¨ber Anthropotechnik. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Smith, V. 2007. Clean: A History of Personal Hygiene and Purity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stelmach, A., and B. Nerlich. 2015. “Metaphors in Search of a Target: The Curious Case of Epige-
netics.” New Genetics and Society 34 (2): 196–218. doi:10.1080/14636778.2015.1034849.
Sulston, J., and G. Ferry. 2002/2003. The Common Thread: Science, Politics, Ethics and the Human
Genome. Bantam: Corgi.
Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Thacker, E. 2005. The Global Genome: Biotechnology, Politics and Culture. Cambridge: The MIT
Press.
Venter, J. C. 2007. A Life Decoded: My Genome, My Life. New York: Viking.
Venter, J. C. 2010. “Multiple Personal Genomes Await.” Nature 464: 676–677. doi:10.1038/464676a.
Venter, J. C. 2013. Life at the Speed of Light: From the Double Helix to the Dawn of Digital Life.
New York: Viking.
Waggoner, M., and T. Uller. 2015. “Epigenetic Determinism in Science and Society.” New Genetics
and Society 34 (2): 177–195. doi:10.1080/14636778.2015.1033052.
Watson, J. D. 1968/1996. The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of
DNA. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Watson, J. D. 2000. A Passion for DNA: Genes, Genomes and Society. Cold Spring Harbor, NY: Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory Press.
Zwart, H. 2000. “A Short History of Food Ethics.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
12: 113–126.
Zwart, H. 2007. “Genomics and Self-Knowledge: Implications for Societal Research and Debate.”
New Genetics and Society 26 (2): 181–202.
Zwart, H. 2008a. “Understanding the Human Genome Project: A Biographical Approach.” New Gen-
etics and Society 27 (4): 353–376.
Zwart, H. 2008b. Pea Stories: Why was Mendel’s Research Ignored in 1866 and Rediscovered in
1900? Understanding Nature. Case studies in Comparative Epistemology, 197–132. Dordrecht:
Springer.
Zwart, H. 2009. “Genomics and Identity: The Bioinformatisation of Human Life.” Medicine, Health
Care and Philosophy: a European Journal 12: 125–136.
Zwart, H. 2013. “The Genome as the Biological Unconscious – and the Unconscious as the Psychic
‘Genome’. A Psychoanalytical Rereading of Molecular Genetics.” Cosmos and History: the
Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 9 (2): 198–222.
New Genetics and Society 21
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [8
3.1
28
.12
6.1
57
] a
t 1
1:2
3 0
2 M
arc
h 2
01
6 
